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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting suppression of
results of a blood draw.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Dennis John Halseth with burglary, grand theft, eluding,
DUI, and leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., pp. 38-41, 64-67.) Halseth
moved to suppress evidence resulting from a "warrantless blood draw." (R., pp.
72-73,78-89.) The state opposed the motion (R., pp. 103-12), which proceeded
to hearing (see generally Tr.). The district court granted the motion,1 concluding
it would be "antithetical" to the Supreme Court of the United States' holding that
there is not a per se exigency allowing blood draws for BAC blood testing to hold
that implied consent allows for blood draws for testing.

(R., pp. 119-26.) The

state filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 150-53.)

The district court did not make any factual findings on Halseth's allegation that
he refused the test. (R., p. 121 (noting that Halseth alleged he verbally refused
to allow a blood draw).) The district court ultimately granted the motion on the
bases that the search was conducted without a search warrant and the state
failed to show that the search was justified under exigent circumstances. (R., pp.
121-26.)
1
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ISSUES
Did the district court err when it concluded that because the blood draw in
this case was not justified by one exception to the warrant requirement
(exigency) it necessarily could not be justified by a different exception (implied
consent)?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Implied Consent Exception
Does Not Apply In This Case Because The Exigency Exception Does Not Apply
In This Case
Introduction
The district court first noted that in Missouri v. McNeely, _

U.S. _ , 133

S.Ct. 1552 (2013), the Supreme Court of the United States had concluded that
there was no per se exigency, allowing a blood draw for BAC testing, created by
the body's natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood, and therefore a warrant
had to be acquired for the search unless an exigency was shown to exist in the
case.

(R., pp.

123-24.)

Interpreting McNeely as holding that exigent

circumstances must be shown to justify any warrantless blood draw, the district
court held that because "the blood draw was not justified by exigent
circumstances" it "violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely." (R., pp. 123-26.) The district
court's determination that McNeely eliminated the implied consent exception is
erroneous, and therefore the district court's suppression order should be
reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a

suppression motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly
erroneous, but the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts found.

State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183

(2009).

3

C.

The District Court Erred By Concluding That Consent To BAC Testing By
Blood Draw May Not Be Implied By Law
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
I

"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v.
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).)

Consent is such an

exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied
consent statute.

State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42

(2007).
In its analysis the district court concluded that the McNeely decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States contains the "announcement that, absent
exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment mandates that an qfficer obtain a
warrant prior to conducting a blood draw," and therefore the state could not justify
a warrantless blood draw absent exigent circumstances "by simply arguing
implied consent."

(R., p. 7.)

By holding that implied consent is not a valid

exception to the warrant requirement, the district court erred.
This Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent circumstances are

different exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160

P .3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable exception here;
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement."). The
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this as well in McNeely. In that

4

case the only question before the Court was "whether the natural metabolization
of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual
blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. The Court
held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on
the totality of the circumstances."

Id.

Thus, the issue was limited to

"nonconsensual blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited to
the exigent circumstances exception. Moreover, in addressing whether a caseby-case

analysis

under the

exigency

exception

would

"undermine

the

governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses," the
Court specifically stated that states would still "have a broad range of legal tools
to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without
undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent
laws."

kL.

at 1565-66.

Far from holding that the state may not legally imply

consent by a motorist, the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws. 2
Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement, and such
exception may be implied by law. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302.;03, 160 P.3d at 74142.

This exception applies regardless of the applicability of the exigency

exception.

kL.;

see also State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,712-13, 184 P.3d 215,

The district court also concluded that the state's argument that "protest to a
blood draw does not negate the implied consent" was "contradictory to a
reasonable interpretation of the implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002." (R., p.
125.) Idaho appellate courts "have long held that a driver has no legal right to
resist or refuse evidentiary testing." State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 909, 243
P.3d 1093, 1097 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing cases back to 1989). The district court
lacked authority to overrule the interpretation of the implied consent statute by
Idaho appellate courts and was not at liberty to ignore that binding precedent.
2
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218-1 9 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Even if the exigent circumstances exception was
inapplicable, the blood draw was valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent.").
The district court's conclusion that implied consent is not a valid exception to the
warrant requirement, and therefore the state must show exigency, is erroneous.

CONCLUSION
The state requests that the district court's order suppressing the evidence
obtained by the blood draw be reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.

Deputy Attorney
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